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I
n his annual letter to shareholders five years ago,
Warren Buffett made clear what he thought of 
derivatives: “financial weapons of mass destruction,”
he famously called them. Derivatives are financial instru-
ments that allow investors to put down relatively little
money in taking bets on the future value of an underlying
asset. Critics say that these instruments make it too easy for
speculators to take excessive risks. Buffett pointed to the
experience of Long Term Capital Management, the hedge
fund whose derivative-heavy investment strategy backfired
in 1998 and prompted a $3.5 billion bailout to maintain 
stability in the financial markets.
But despite this cautionary view, the market for credit
derivatives and other credit market innovations has been
rapidly expanding in recent years. The volume of outstand-
ing credit derivatives soared to $34 trillion in 2006
compared with less than $1 trillion just five years earlier,
according to the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association. Securitization and single-name credit default
swaps, once exotic names, are now just plain vanilla. More
sophisticated structures are entering the market, offering
investors new risk and return opportunities.
These innovations have created new ways to distribute
credit risk, or the risk of default on a bond or a loan, to a
broader set of market players. Strong demand from investors
means that lenders are better able to offload and manage
risk, which ultimately frees up more capital and funding.
Consequently, borrowers benefit by having more credit
available at better prices.
Recent events have raised questions about whether
financial innovations have gone too far. This summer’s finan-
cial market turbulence, with the wobbly subprime mortgage
market at its center, has burned many investors. The discus-
sion on whether new financial devices have made the system
more stable or, as Buffett sees them, “time bombs” which
carry dangers that are “potentially lethal,” persists as strong
as ever. 
Earlier this year, some of the leading experts on credit
market innovations gathered in Charlotte, N.C., to weigh in
on this question. (All the views and comments in this article
came from participants during the event, which happened in
March.) Overall, credit market innovations should help
make the financial system more efficient and more resilient,
said New York Fed President Timothy Geithner at the sym-
posium, which was hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond. But Geithner is part of the prevailing economic
view that certain characteristics of this wave of innovation
— its complexity and the market-based nature of credit —
require attention. So even as bankers, asset managers, risk
managers, and policymakers gathered at the symposium to
extol the virtues of this new financial order, they also aimed
to address the challenges that have come with remarkable
growth in credit markets.
Deeper Markets
Credit market innovations have dramatically changed the
way that banks do business. “I would say business has
changed for the better,” says Donald Truslow, chief risk 
officer at Wachovia Corp. “[These innovations] have
allowed us to be much more effective risk managers … and
[to have] many more tools for helping to balance the risk-
reward equation in our institution than we used to have.”
For instance, banks have benefited tremendously from
the emergence of credit derivatives. They now have a 
feasible way to hedge against the risk that a borrower will
default, and also a better way to diversify or avoid huge 
concentrations of one type of exposure in their portfolios.
Instead of “originating” loans and then holding on to the risk
that borrowers won’t repay, banks today can lend money and
then transfer that credit exposure to others through the 
capital markets. By “isolating” the risk of default and then
selling this risk to investors who are willing to hold it, credit
risk becomes a tradable asset. 
The most widely used credit derivative, the credit default
swap, helps illustrate this process. It is a contract that 
transfers the risk of default from the protection buyer (the
bank) to the protection seller (the counterparty). The bank
pays a premium for this protection and the seller of the 
credit default swap agrees to compensate the bank in the
event that the borrowing company cannot or is unwilling to
pay its loan. Alternatively, banks may wish to sell protection
in order to gain exposure to other types of borrowers and
further diversify their portfolios.
But the most dynamic area in credit markets in recent
years comes from an impressive array of alphabet soup 
structures that slice, dice, and distribute credit risk. One
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“synthetic” collateralized debt obliga-
tion. Traditional collateralized debt
obligations involve the transfer of
loans to a “special purpose vehicle,”
which is responsible for bundling and
repackaging a bunch of these loans
and then issuing them in groups, or
“tranches,” with different levels of sen-
iority that determine the order of
repayment. However, many loans have
confidentiality clauses and transfer
restrictions, which makes it difficult
for banks to set up this type of credit
structure. But with the widespread use
of credit default swaps, banks can now
replicate this arrangement by pooling
together swaps instead of loans.
Such instruments target different
investors by giving them the opportu-
nity to invest in or sell protection on a
particular tranche or slice of losses in
the event that companies in that 
portfolio default. For instance, an
investor could agree to compensate a
protection buyer on the first 3 percent
to 7 percent of losses of a portfolio.
Other investors can take a slice of the
remaining exposure, depending on
their appetite for risk. Some investors
may be willing to take on more risk in
exchange for higher returns. Equity
tranches are the riskiest and the first
to absorb losses. These are sometimes
called “toxic waste” because of their
high exposure to risk. But separating
this exposure also allows the creation
of senior tranches that earn AAA
credit ratings. It should be noted that,
in the context of mortgage-related
securities, some observers have
recently questioned the accuracy of
credit ratings on complex financial
instruments. 
A wide range of instruments with
varying risk and return opportunities
means that there is potentially some-
thing to satisfy every taste, thus
encouraging more players to partici-
pate in the market. The more
participants there are, the easier it will
be to buy and sell these credit instru-
ments at prices that everyone can see,
which in turn attracts more investors.
Ultimately, credit risks are spread out
to those who are better suited to hold
or trade these risks, which should
make financial markets less volatile.
“On its face, a wider dispersion of
credit risk would seem to enhance the
stability of the financial system by
reducing the likelihood that credit
defaults will weaken any one financial
institution or class of financial institu-
tions,” says Fed Board Governor
Randall Kroszner. 
The consequences of these new
instruments may be too early to assess,
but the experience with earlier vintages
offers some evidence that credit market
innovations have made financial mar-
kets more stable. For instance, the U.S.
financial system was able to absorb the
substantial scale of corporate defaults
that peaked in 2002, Geithner says. He
added that there hasn’t been strong
empirical support that derivatives
increase volatility in financial markets,
nor has credit market innovation so far
resulted in a large increase in leverage in
the corporate sector.
Credit market innovation may also
smooth credit cycles — the ups and
downs of the volume of credit extended
to companies. Before credit deriva-
tives were traded, banks adjusted their
supply of credit mostly in response to
their own loan review process, which
came with significant lags to actual
turns in the credit cycle. But with a
growing credit derivatives market, the
price and quality of credit has become
more transparent, such that banks
may be better able to anticipate and
manage the effects of the turns in 
the credit cycle, according to the 
2006 International Monetary Fund
(IMF) Global Financial Stability
Report. This allows them to act on
price signals sooner and adjust their
credit portfolios in a more gradual
manner, thus creating less volatility in
credit supply.  
Mark Carey, an economist at the
Fed’s Board of Governors, is optimistic
about less cyclicality in credit supply.
“It’s been my observation that a crunch
happens when people start to feel that
they don’t understand what’s happen-
ing, and there’s more knowledge of
credit risk now than there was 10, 20,
30 years ago,” Carey says. “Even though
there are more complicated products,
and certainly in the next downturn
some sellers of credit protection are
going to get wiped out, as long as
understanding continues to grow, the
market will function very efficiently.”
The Risk of Spreading Risk
Credit market innovations can pro-
mote financial stability by spreading
out the potential pain of a market dis-
ruption. However, there is a concern
that the same process that allows more
participants to carry and trade risk
also gives them the opportunity to
accumulate a lot of it. In other words,
there may be more hands to pass the
risk around, but that risk could still be
concentrated in the hands of a few. 
Hence, diversity, in terms of the
type of participants, their strategies,
and the factors that influence their
behavior, significantly determines the
liquidity of the credit risk transfer
market, says Todd Groome, an econo-
mist at the IMF. Liquidity, or the
relative ease with which a buyer and
seller can trade, is especially important
in times of financial stress, in order to
ensure that a rapid reshuffling of
assets does not trigger a sharp change
in market prices. “If I look around in
the market and everybody looks like
me, then that’s not a good thing,”
Groome says. “They’re likely to be
influenced for the same reasons that
I’m influenced to seek liquidity at the
same times.”  
Nonbank financial institutions
have been much more active in credit
markets in recent years. This has
enhanced the “transferability,” or the
liquidity, of credit risk in the primary
market; that is, the ability of banks to
find a willing buyer for the credit risk
on their balance sheets. Once that 
risk has been sold, the relevant ques-
tion becomes, are there enough buyers
and sellers out there in the secondary
market to keep financial markets
steady in the event of a disruption?
Investors with longer-term hori-
zons such as insurance companies,
pension funds, and mutual funds 
may be looking to buy credit risk to
satisfy their asset-liability manage-
Summer 2007 • Region Focus 17
REGION FOCUS REWORK SUMMER ISSUE  9/20/07  4:17 PM  Page 17ment objectives but not
necessarily trade it. What
this implies, according to
Groome, is that the private
sector response to market
disruptions increasingly is
tied to one group of
investors: the hedge fund
community. 
Hedge funds typically
invest amounts well in
excess of their capital base
on complex trading tech-
niques and instruments, in
pursuit of high returns
promised to wealthy clients.
They are not subject to 
the same regulations as many other
financial market players. There is a
concern about hedge funds using a lot
of leverage and investing in instru-
ments that themselves can be highly
leveraged, like derivatives. But because
of the nature of their strategies, hedge
funds are very active in the credit mar-
ket. “The nimble investor out there,
the guy looking for relative value is
really centered in the hedge fund com-
munity … they’re the ones buying
distressed institutions, buying portfo-
lios, and providing lines of credit,” 
says Groome.
This invites the question: How
diverse is the hedge fund community?
That may be a difficult one to answer,
although a recent experience can 
provide some perspective. In May
2005, debt downgrades of some
automakers caused a painful period of
turmoil in the credit derivatives mar-
ket. Some hedge funds closed as a
result. But according to the IMF, that
disruption was relatively limited and
short-lived, primarily because other
hedge funds with diverse investment
strategies and sufficient capital
thought that those credit instruments
were a bargain. “[Hedge funds] could
lean against the market and within
three to four days of the major down-
draft provide important stabilizing
liquidity,” says Groome. 
But with the growing role of hedge
funds in credit markets, Kroszner
thinks that banks which trade with and
lend to hedge funds must ask whether
they “have enough collateral to protect
them against a stress scenario that goes
well beyond the recent benign experi-
ence in credit markets.” Large losses to
hedge funds can threaten financial sta-
bility by severely affecting banks that
are at the core of the financial system.
Prime brokers, for instance, are typi-
cally large globally active investment
banks that provide leverage and issue
credit lines to hedge funds, along with
the business of consolidating a hedge
fund’s trades with several dealers. A
crucial part of the structure rests on
these core institutions that act as gate-
keepers to the broader financial
system.
Thus, in times of stress, how much
of a shock absorber can these banks
be? Effective risk management is key.
“The important thing is to understand
the risks that are in your book,” says
Thomas Daula, chief risk officer of
investment bank Morgan Stanley.
Adam Gilbert, managing director 
of risk management services at
JPMorgan, another investment bank,
thinks that stronger liquidity manage-
ment and capital practices have put
financial institutions in a position to be
that shock absorber. “The extent to
which one might do that in any particu-
lar circumstance will be a function of
the environment at that time, but we
think about potential problems or 
disruptions in an opportunistic way
rather than trying to head for the door,”
says Gilbert. 
The difficulty of managing these
risks is exacerbated by the
complexity and short history
of these new credit instru-
ments. Investors take
positions based on what they
think will happen in the future,
taking into account certain
risks and scenarios. But
because there may be behav-
iors and relationships that they
do not yet understand, even
the most sophisticated
investor will be vulnerable to
unanticipated losses. 
There is also concern that
transferring risks may have
created incentives for financial
institutions to overextend credit and
assume excessive credit risk. If the
credit risks attached to a loan or a bond
can be sold off relatively easily, then it
may not matter much to the lender
whether the borrower eventually pays
up. The recent travails in the subprime
mortgage market and the relaxation of
credit standards there come to mind.
But there are signs that credit stan-
dards on the corporate side may have
loosened as well. The concerns are natu-
rally coming from investors of these
instruments, such as hedge funds.
Samuel Cole, chief operating officer of
BlueMountain Capital, a New York-
based hedge fund, thinks that the deals
the market was seeing earlier this year
are different from the ones of just a 
few years ago, that there has been 
“a steady deterioration of credit quality.”
The volume of leveraged loans
(those issued by companies with a
lower credit quality) with few financial
covenants attached, have been setting
records and were absorbed by the mar-
ket “with hardly a speed bump,”
according to a January 2007 report by
Standard and Poor’s, a rating agency.
The reason for this strong supply was
the robust demand for collateralized
loan obligations, which quickly
repackage these loans and sell them to
investors like hedge funds. (Acollater-
alized  loan obligation is a type of
collateralized debt obligation that con-
sists of corporate loan exposures.)
However, this market is now showing
signs of slowing down. 
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The volume of credit derivatives has doubled almost every year  
since 2001. 
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does not by itself cause credit standards
to weaken as long as the risk is priced
appropriately. Thus, there would be a
cause for worry if there is a reason to
think that the price is not right.
The Role of Policy 
Critics are concerned about the trans-
fer of credit risk outside the banking
system. They argue that because these
market participants are subject to less
regulation and supervision, they are
not as effective as banks at managing
risks. However, Kroszner thinks that
unlike banks which have a “safety net”
to support them, lightly regulated
entities are subject to more market
discipline because their creditors
“have stronger incentives to monitor
and limit their risk-taking.” 
Still, many have asked policy-
makers to regulate this new financial
order, from its exotic instruments to
the financial institutions that use
them such as hedge funds. However,
while it may be easy in hindsight to
identify financial market mistakes,
Richmond Fed president Jeff Lacker
says that it is important for policymak-
ers “to guard against Monday morning
quarterbacking” and easily concluding 
that judgments made by financial mar-
kets were suspect or flawed. Markets
should be assessed on whether they
made the right decisions at the time
that those decisions were being made,
which is not an easy thing to do. 
Although financial markets may not
get things right all the time, it is diffi-
cult for policymakers to assess where
the stops should be placed without
running the risk of disrupting the flow
of the market and, in the process, unin-
tentionally inflicting more harm than
good. Thus, financial markets may be
better arbiters of whether prices of
assets reflect their fundamental values
and of seizing opportunities during
market disruptions. 
But policymakers can still play an
important role in mitigating the risks
that come with credit market innova-
tion. Although they may not have the
capacity to monitor risk concentra-
tions outside the banking system,
policymakers can help strengthen the
core financial institutions, the shock
absorbers of the system, by continuing
to make sure that they have the capital
and liquidity to survive shocks. The
stronger these core firms are, “the
more resilient markets will be in the
face of future shocks, and the more
confident we can be that banks will be
a source of strength and of liquidity to
markets in periods of stress,” says
Geithner. Policymakers can also help
strengthen these core firms by some-
times taking the lead when a collective
action by market participants is
deemed necessary.
When the Counterparty Risk
Management Group II, a group of 
private-sector market participants,
called attention to the mounting back-
log of unconfirmed trades in the credit
derivatives market, the New York Fed
invited the 14 leading dealers in the
market to a meeting, urging them to
resolve these backlogs. Delays in con-
firming trades can undermine investor
confidence if they jeopardize the
enforceability of trades and if errors
in recording these transactions lead to
incorrect measurement and misman-
agement of market risks and counter-
party credit risks. The “Fed 14” has 
so far been successful in their 
efforts. Kroszner said that between
September 2005 and December 2006,
the number of confirmations out-
standing for more than 30 days fell by
92 percent, a remarkable achievement
considering the rapid growth in trad-
ing volume in credit derivatives.
But such infrastructure and other
efforts to manage the risks presented
by these new credit instruments, while
laudable, remain untested for a severe
downturn. This makes the question of
whether the financial system has
become safer or riskier a difficult one
to answer. Indeed, these credit instru-
ments have been flourishing in a
generally benign and supportive
macroeconomic environment with
strong global economic growth, low
and stable inflation, and healthy cor-
porate balance sheets. The rather
tumultuous period that the financial
market finds itself in today may be its
toughest test so far. 
Credit market innovations may
make shocks to the financial system
less frequent, but they could also make
the system more sensitive to a big
shock. In this way, Buffet’s “time
bomb” view may be right. But market
participants seem to understand that
the task at hand is to find ways to
defuse that bomb, to mitigate that 
violent shock should it occur. 
The threat of the bad constantly
reminds that in order to fully reap 
the benefits of these innovations, 
market participants and policymakers
must respond to the challenges that
accompany them. RF
Summer 2007 • Region Focus 19
Geithner, Timothy. “Credit Market Innovations and their
Implications.” Presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond Credit Markets Symposium, March 23, 2007.
Hildebrand, Philipp M. “Hedge Funds and Prime Broker Dealers:
Steps towards a ‘Best Practice Proposal.’” Banque de France
Financial Stability Review — Special Issue on Hedge Funds, April
2007, no. 10, pp. 67-76.
The International Monetary Fund Global Financial Stability
Report, April 2006.
The Report of the Counterparty Risk Management Group II.
“Toward Greater Financial Stability: APrivate Sector Perspective.”
July 27, 2005.
Kroszner, Randall. “Recent Innovations in Credit Markets.”
Presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Credit
Markets Symposium, March 22, 2007.
Mengle, David. “Credit Derivatives: An Overview.” Presented at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial Markets
Conference, May 15, 2007.
R EADINGS
RF SUMMER HR2pg19 - 9/21/2007 3:32 PM